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SUBJECT: EU RESPONSE: SUDAN - ACCELERATING UNSC ACTION ON  
RE-HATting AMIS

REF: STATE 42555

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1. (C) Summary. The EU agrees with the U.S. interpretation that the three components of the AU decision of March 10 regarding the transition of AMIS are not interlinked. However, the EU is concerned that UN Assistant Secretary Annabi may perceive a linkage. EU Special Representative Pekka Haavisto will stress the need for African countries to press for a UNSC resolution during his upcoming trip to Abuja. End Summary.

2. (C) Per reftel, PRMOFF conveyed U.S. concerns about diverging views of the March 10 AU decision to transition the AMIS peacekeeping operation in Darfur to UN forces and urged the EU to make similar demarches to key African states. EU Council policy advisor on Sudan, Christian Manahl, expressed total support for the U.S. interpretation of the AU decision. He credited this positive outcome to the joint U.S.-EU efforts to influence Konare and said that the statement regarding transitioning was more positive than the EU had expected. Manahl agreed that the three components were separate and that a rehatting was not conditioned on a peace agreement in Abuja.

3. (C) Manahl expressed concern, however, with statements from UN officials concerning links between the three components. He noted that on March 13, Assistant Secretary General Annabi himself had made a link between the Abuja talks and rehatting, saying that if there were no peace agreement the UN would not accept taking the peace mission over from AMIS. Manahl noted that Annabi had made a similar point during the March 8 meeting with the DepSec and High Representative Solana in Brussels. Manahl worried that should the UN continue to perceive a link, the international community could find AMIS winding up with no UN successor in place.

4. (C) Regarding the amount of time necessary to make an effective transition, Manahl noted that Annabi called for six to nine months, and at this point the UN has six months to develop and implement a plan. He said that the UN should be able to establish at least a modest presence by October 1 and gradually build up its size (similar to the gradual build up of AMIS). He added that he hoped the AU's extension of the AMIS mandate to September 30 was the last (although a brief extension at a later date might be acceptable if the UN were unable to establish a competent presence by October 1).

5. (C) Manahl was not aware that some countries were pushing different views of the March 10 AU statement in New York. Regarding Russia, Manahl said that EU Special Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto had positive meetings in Moscow two and a half weeks ago and that they had supported the rehatting initiative.

6. (C) On outreach to key African countries, Manahl said that Haavisto had been in Abuja and would return there shortly where he would continue advocating along the lines described in reftel. However, he said that logistically, it would be very difficult for the EU to agree to a unified demarche before the end of the month. That said, key EU Member States were likely to launch their own diplomatic initiatives similar to that being undertaken by the U.S.

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